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The emergence of the private entrepreneur in reform era China: Re-birth 
of an earlier tradition, or a more recent product of development and 
change? 
 
Abstract. A private sector that now dominates economic activity has emerged in China since 
1978, even though many of the essential institutions for market competition have been lacking 
or are under-developed. We find that there is no evidence that this upsurge of 
entrepreneurship is a re-birth of an earlier tradition. Instead, the dynamics of entrepreneurial 
emergence can be attributed to reforms and institutional changes that have occurred since 
1949, both before and after the introduction of economic reforms in late 1978. We find that 
these institutional changes have been evolutionary, adapting to as well as shaping emerging 
forms of economic activity, including entrepreneurship. Our conclusion is that these dynamics 
of adaptation and evolution produce ‘rule ambiguities’ within the institutional framework that 
create opportunities for entrepreneurs as well as making these opportunities vulnerable to 
further institutional change. 
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Introduction 
A central feature of China’s recent economic development has been the emergence of a 
private sector that generates the majority of the country’s economic activity and growth. This 
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emergence has occurred even though China has lacked key market institutions during much of 
the reform period, in particular: established commercial and contract laws from which 
entrepreneurs can seek redress when contracts are not honoured; and legally enforceable and 
recognised private property rights that provide protection of the entrepreneur’s assets and 
returns.1 The rapid growth of private sector entrepreneurship in China cannot be attributed to 
the types of market institutions that create conducive conditions for entrepreneurship in most 
developed economies.2 Instead, growth has preceded the introduction of the market 
institutions that are considered essential to private sector development. Why, then, did a 
dynamic private sector emerge when China lacked market institutions deemed necessary for 
entrepreneurship?3 
One explanation would be the re-emergence of a pre-revolutionary legacy of enterprise during 
China’s recent reform period, when conditions became more conducive to entrepreneurship 
than they had been during the preceding period of central planning.4 We reassess the notion 
that such a legacy explains the rise of an entrepreneurial private sector in today’s China. In 
particular, we critique assertions that China’s Confucian tradition has served as a foundation 
for entrepreneurial emergence during the reform period.5 
Rather than reach back into pre-revolutionary China, we propose that private sector 
emergence needs to be understood within the broader context of the evolution of market 
mechanisms and regulation during the post-1978 reform period. This focus on structural 
changes to the ways in which the economy has been organised during the reform period lends 
itself to an institutionalist perspective. Institutionalist approaches, derived from the New 
Institutional Economics work of North and others, consider the ‘rules of the game’ of market 
exchange and how these rules are governed and sanctions taken should they be broken. 6  In 
other words, institutionalist perspectives focus on the extent to which market mechanisms 
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exist that enable efficient and transparent exchange. Where institutions enable market 
exchange, conditions are conducive for entrepreneurs to operate in a predictable and 
consistent environment.7 However, where they are not formed, or do not enable exchange, 
incentives are created that produce destructive or non-productive entrepreneurship.8 The 
development of institutions that have variable effects on entrepreneurship has become an 
emergent area of research on private sector development in transition economies, in large part 
because experiences in the former Soviet Union and countries such as China show that 
development of market institutions is the most challenging component of market reform and 
liberalisation.9  
Institutional perspectives on entrepreneurship in China recognise the wider context within 
which the private sector developed, situating development of market institutions alongside 
changes in ownership from public to private, and significant economic liberalisation and 
reform.10 The positive effects of market liberalisation - including for example greater 
productivity, more competition and innovation, and increased demand from consumers and 
businesses - have created conducive conditions for private sector development. In addition, 
the state has stimulated growth through investment in infrastructure, development and 
acquisition of technologies, and promotion of key industries and enterprises. As such, the 
emergence of the private sector can be considered a product, and feature, of overall economic 
growth and the changes this has brought to the Chinese economy, as well as a dynamic 
enabled by particular institutional configurations during China’s reform period. 
Within this broader context of national growth, we explore three key institutional features 
of the early reform period that enabled entrepreneurial emergence: adaptation of institutions 
and mechanisms developed for the planned economy to market governance; contracting out 
rights of production from the state to the individual; and hybrid forms of governance, where 
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ownership remains with the state but management is contracted to the private sector. 
Crucially, contracts and hybrid ownership-management arrangements offered an intermediate 
position between public and private ownership, so avoiding ideological challenges to the 
emergence of an increasingly marketised economy.  
We note that hybrid ownership arrangements were discouraged after the major reform of 
the state-owned sector during the latter half of the 1990s, as China embarked on a more 
explicit commitment to institutional convergence with OECD countries. Economic growth 
since then has occurred largely as a result of de facto privatisation of much of the state sector, 
and by increasingly laissez-faire regulation of the private sector. This reflected a fundamental 
transition in the role that the state played in economic development, moving from central 
planner and enterprise manager to creating the conditions for competition and macro-
economic stability. A key dimension of this has been the adaptation of existing institutions 
designed for China’s planned economy to better fit the requirements for increased market 
governance. This is in contrast to previous work, which has attributed the rise of the private 
sector to the existence of informal institutions, in particular ‘network-based trust’ and guanxi. 
We propose that guanxi facilitated market-based exchange during the earlier years of the 
reform period, in the absence of both substantive inter-personal trust and effective formal 
institutions, but is becoming less important to successful entrepreneurship today.11 
Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, we challenge explanations of private 
sector emergence that reach into a pre-revolutionary past, in order to propose or assume that 
recent entrepreneurial activity is a re-emergence of an historical entrepreneurial culture 
established in Imperial and Republican China. Second, we re-evaluate the development of the 
conditions for private sector emergence since 1949 by identifying embryonic reforms before 
the advent of reform in 1978 that assisted the growth of the private sector. We also find that 
 4 
conditions for entrepreneurship have been far from conducive during China’s recent reform 
period, even though much of the emergence of the private sector was stimulated by 
government policy to liberalise markets. Third, we explain this apparent contradiction through 
the concept of rule ambiguities that concurrently create entrepreneurial opportunities and 
make these opportunities fragile and vulnerable to erosion. Rule ambiguities are a by-product 
of transitional reform, and so have been endemic to China’s recent development. 
Rationale 
Why then does this paper warrant and adopt an historical perspective on what appears to be a 
relatively recent phenomenon? Our response to this is three-fold. Firstly, the recent economic 
history of China tends to be separated explicitly from events before the formal introduction of 
the reform period in late 1978. Although this may serve accounts of China that seek to 
distinguish the politicised era of Maoist China from the more pragmatic and economically-
focused period of reform introduced by Deng Xiaoping, such a strict time threshold deserves 
some consideration. Given the political dynamics of China in the 1970s, where leftist pro-
Mao officials still held sway over much of the state, adoption of the principles of economic 
reform in 1978 required negotiation and bargaining to bring onside factions within the 
Communist Party that needed convincing of the benefits and desirability of reforms.12 The 
mechanism for achieving this was the ‘Western Leap Forward’, echoing the earlier Great 
Leap Forward. Deng Xiaoping convincingly made the argument that ‘seeking the truth from 
facts’ was consistent with Maoist orthodoxy, and also allowed for flexibility in reforms, 
unlike Hua Guofeng’s ‘two whatevers’, which sought to preserve Mao’s thinking.13 Much of 
the two-year period when Hua Guofeng took over as Chairman was taken up with a campaign 
to garner formal support for reform within the Communist Party.14 Moreover, there were 
tentative experiments with reform during the early to mid-1970s, as reported by a number of 
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commentators on China who argue that the 1978 transition to reform was the culmination of 
factors and events that preceded this key and public event.15 
Secondly, the reform era has brought with it social as well as economic liberalisation, 
which in turn has stimulated reassessments of China’s past. Rising interest in China’s pre-
revolutionary cultural traditions, re-exploration of Confucianism as a unifying dimension of 
Chinese culture, and increased participation in the worship of traditional religions, all point to 
attempts to re-negotiate contemporary China’s relationship with its past.16 In China, however, 
remembering the past is challenging, especially when such accounts consider the country’s 
recent history since 1949 as well as the preceding period. The Mao period was turbulent and 
remains sensitive to critical analysis, not only because of the periods of national stress and 
breakdown – the famines and economic collapse of the Great Leap Forward, and the 
widespread upheaval of the Cultural Revolution – but also because much of the logic of this 
period was to eradicate the legacies and structures of pre-revolutionary China.17 A starting 
point for this paper, which is fundamental to our analysis of the emergence of the private 
sector during the reform period, is to consider the effects of China’s past on entrepreneurship 
in contemporary China. 
Third, the pace and extent of economic growth and change in China as a result of the 
emergence of the private sector since 1978 will fundamentally shape the country’s future 
development. In 1978, official statistics indicated that the state sector made up more than 99% 
of the economy.18 By 2007, the share of GDP by the non-state sector was at least 65% and by 
some accounts higher.19 As highlighted by Easley, in the period from 1978 to 2004 
employment in the private sector went up 300 times and numbers of private enterprises 
increased at an average rate of 29 per cent a year.20 Given the growing proportion of 
economic activity accounted for by the private sector, the continued development of private 
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enterprise is key to future GDP growth. As a result, the extent to which current and future 
conditions are conducive to entrepreneurship will affect national growth and prosperity. 
The motivation for this paper and the basis for framing our research question have been the 
authors’ direct and on-going involvement with private sector development in China since the 
1990s. This has arisen from engagement with both government and entrepreneurs, creating a 
recent historical experience and perspective on private sector development in China. As well 
as allowing personal insight into the issues covered in this paper over an extended period, this 
has led to publication of a series of papers on private sector development. These engagements 
and outputs highlight both the pace of private sector emergence and the complex and 
changing nature of the relationship between the state and entrepreneurs in China.  
By way of situating this paper in the personal histories of individuals wrapped up in these 
change processes, we offer three brief narratives of specific instances that capture our 
research question. The first starts in the ‘Trade Union Hotel’ in an industrial city in China’s 
north in the late 1990s. An internationally educated high-ranking provincial official, charged 
with the triple challenge of restructuring bankrupt state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
transferring ownership of smaller SOEs to non-state entities, and encouraging a then-small 
private sector to grow in order to employ laid-off workers from the SOEs, acknowledged the 
importance of the private sector, while at the same time observing that few in government had 
experience or knowledge of running private enterprises. He recognised the importance of the 
private sector, but queried the capacity of the government to design and implement 
interventions to enable its development. 
The second plays out in Western China a few years later, in the early 2000s. In a now 
booming city, the government of which was then peppered with former soldiers holding 
largely negative views about entrepreneurs, we worked with a municipal official also charged 
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with stimulating the private sector in order to generate new jobs for workers laid off from 
SOEs. He expressed his frustration at having to work with and support local entrepreneurs. In 
his view, they were making much more money than government officials such as him. Why 
then should he commit state resources and funding to help these individuals to make more 
money for themselves?  
The third occurs in the second half of the 2000s, during an early evening business dinner in 
Beijing with a state official from a national government body responsible for SME policy. By 
this time, private enterprises had come to account for more than half of economic activity, 
following on from widespread privatisation of smaller SOEs and Township and Village 
Enterprises.21 The government had sought to create an institutional framework to enable 
private sector development through introduction of the SME Promotion Law. This legislation 
required municipalities to establish a comprehensive system to stimulate private enterprise 
development. Despite this, only one city in China, Shenzhen, had created a system of agencies 
to advise and fund private enterprises. The response by government was to support pilot 
projects to set up SME support systems in ten cities. At that point, all were still in the pilot 
stage, and there appeared little confidence that they would deliver the SME support systems 
envisaged in the original legislation. 
Each of these brief narratives highlights the central question of this paper, namely: why did 
the private sector emerge so successfully in an environment where the institutions, legislation 
and policies to enable entrepreneurship were lacking? 
In order to inform our analysis, we adopt an institutionalist perspective on entrepreneurial 
emergence in China. Institutional theory, and in particular New Institutional Economics, is 
increasingly used in the entrepreneurship literature on China and on economic transition. 22 
Institutional theory emphasises the ‘rules of the game’ of market exchange and broader 
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socioeconomic transaction. These can be formal, and they include the legal and market 
regulation frameworks within which entrepreneurs operate. They can also be informal, 
emerging from cultural values and socially embedded practices.23 The extent to which the 
institutional ‘rules of the game’ enable transparent and enforceable market exchange is 
generally considered essential for entrepreneurs to operate.24 The relevance of institutional 
theory to entrepreneurship in transition economies is increasingly recognised, in large part 
because many of the key institutions that enable market transactions are in flux in these 
contexts.25  
In this paper, we challenge three dimensions of institutional theory as it relates to 
entrepreneurship in transition economies. Firstly, we present China as a distinctive case of 
institutional evolution rather than displacement, and so propose that the institutional voids 
seen in the Former Soviet Union, where institutions from the past were removed and replaced 
with new institutions, are not a central feature of entrepreneurial emergence in China. This is 
an important distinction, because theorisations of economic transition have been informed by 
the experience of the Former Soviet Union, where institutions were dismantled and new 
institutions introduced, so creating institutional ‘voids’ for entrepreneurs.26 Secondly, we 
identify changes in institutional frameworks that have occurred over much shorter time 
periods, decades rather than centuries, than has been proposed in the institutional literature.27 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, we present reform-era China as a case where 
entrepreneurship has emerged even though the institutions to enable effective market 
exchange were not fully established.28  
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Institutional change within a broader context of national economic growth in China 
Although an institutional perspective allows for a theoretically consistent consideration of the 
emergence of entrepreneurship in reform era China, like any theoretical framework its 
explanatory power and reach has limitations. As such, we recognise that an institutional 
perspective offers a partial, and hence incomplete, representation of the complexity of 
economic development and entrepreneurial growth in China since 1978. Recent applications 
of institutional theory to China confirm this point, noting that institutional development and 
change is one aspect of economic transition, alongside wider dynamics of market 
liberalisation and economic reform. 29 High levels of infrastructure investment throughout the 
reform period, foreign direct investment, increased international trade, and improvements in 
factor inputs – in particular educational and human capital effects on labour and technology as 
a performance enhancer of capital – have been important drivers of wider economic growth. 30 
As a consequence of these wider positive effects of economic growth, the conditions for 
entrepreneurship to emerge have improved, encouraging entrepreneurs to start and grow 
private enterprises. 31 
Although these broader dynamics of growth and development exist, and have helped 
stimulate private sector development, our focus on institutional change and development is 
justified in two ways. Firstly, there is evidence that the emergence of a private sector of 
entrepreneurs can be attributed in large part to reforms, and that institutional change made up 
a large proportion of these reforms. Indeed, one analysis concludes that seven-eighths of the 
increase in total factor productivity in the reform period was a result of reforms and that 
institutional change was fundamental to these increases. 32 Secondly, the standard approach 
advocated by institutional economists such as Acemoglu and Rodrik does not appear to hold 
in China, where entrepreneurs have emerged even though the institutions considered 
necessary for private sector activity have not been in place for much of the reform era. 33 The 
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standard institutional premise is that without effectively functioning market institutions, 
economic growth through private sector activity will not occur. China therefore represents a 
particular and distinctive context for institutional change and development that does not align 
with institutional theorisations of economic development and change in other countries and 
contexts. 
 
Institutional constraints on entrepreneurship before 1949 
There has been a tendency to identify in China’s pre-communist period a ‘Confucian tradition 
[that] created its own version of Adam Smith’s moral sentiments’, which has since served as a 
latent foundation for entrepreneurial emergence during the reform period.34 However, 
twentieth-century China before the Chinese Communist Party came to power was 
economically as well as politically turbulent, with the country experiencing invasion by Japan 
(occupying Manchuria in 1931), civil war and conflict between the Guomindang and the 
Communist Party of China from the 1920s, and the emergence of local warlords with little 
interest in economic development and growth. Where entrepreneurship emerged, such as in 
Shanghai in the 1920s, this brief ‘tradition’ disappeared in the economic turbulence of the 
1930s.35 
The Republic, established in 1911 after the death of the last Qing dynasty ruler, Empress 
Dowager Cixi, failed to establish control over large parts of China. The final years of Imperial 
China, before Cixi’s death, were economically as well as financially conservative, with little 
economic reform or opening up, and no emergence of a technocratic elite outside Imperial 
circles or of effective state entrepreneurship.36 This was in clear contrast to Japan during the 
Meiji Restoration of the second half of the nineteenth century. Attempts to reinforce 
Confucian values by the Qing dynasty in the second half of the nineteenth century were 
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perceived as not credible in either re-asserting these values or the political legitimacy of a 
declining dynasty.37  
Society and the economy in late Imperial China and Republican China can be characterised 
as suffering from weak and, as civil war and conflict emerged, weakening institutions, that 
undermined the governance of entrepreneurial activity.38 As a result, social mechanisms to 
enable market exchange, such as guanxi and related forms of favour exchange and reciprocity 
that had emerged in earlier Imperial times were also weakened.39 The consequence of this 
was that, although these institutional forms of interaction continued to exist, and had 
substantive as well as symbolic importance, their effectiveness and the governance of them 
eroded as wider economic and political uncertainty emerged in the first half of the twentieth 
century. 
Over a longer period, there is little evidence of a tradition of encouraging entrepreneurship. 
The values developed during the Qing Dynasty and earlier Imperial rule appear to be more 
consonant with a Confucian sense of social and economic administration through order and 
hierarchy than with a developed ‘market morality’.40 The Imperial system centralised, rather 
than localised, economic as well as political activity, with the state operating as public 
entrepreneur across much of the Imperial economy: for example, in salt mining and grain 
transportation through the Grand Canal. This system was predominantly administrative and 
bureaucratic in nature, built on a system of elevation to official status through passing 
national examinations, preparation for which focused on legislative and philosophical, rather 
than commercial, knowledge. The magistrates who operated locally as tax collectors and 
administrators for the Emperor, in other words, came from a world of regulation rather than a 
world of commerce.  
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The class divisions that characterized the Imperial Era constrained entrepreneurial activity. 
Under the strict hierarchical social system, based on Neo-Confucian thought, scholars and 
farmers maintained higher positions in the social strata than artisans and merchants.41 Under 
this system making a profit was seen as unethical, and characteristic of an inferior person.42 
This discouraged individuals, especially those from the intellectual or landowning classes, 
from seeking a living through engaging in business. In addition, limited value was placed on 
the protection of intellectual property during the Imperial Era. Knowledge was seen as 
something that should be shared widely (a social good), rather than something that could be 
commoditized and protected under the law.43 This proved a disincentive for individuals to 
innovate, and so served as a constraint on entrepreneurial activity.  
As a result, the merchant classes and associated institutions, such as guilds, that developed 
in Europe were partially formed within a rigid hierarchical system that subordinated 
merchants.44 Economic activities focused on trading, rather than specialisation in crafts-based 
skills and production, and were organised by identity (geographical or ethnic) of the trading 
network, rather than by occupation and technical expertise.45 Even though a more marketised 
countryside emerged towards the end of the Imperial Era and into the early years of 
Republican rule, it did not produce large surpluses and was predominantly focused on the 
family, undertaking small-scale economic activity concerned mainly with agricultural 
production and trading.46 Where international trade stimulated trading networks, middleman 
compradors made these activities expensive and inefficient.47 
Additional factors constraining the industrial development of China over several centuries 
included: the capacity of rice farming to generate positive, but diminishing, marginal yields 
that sustained a large rural population; well-developed trade networks that allowed efficient 
distribution of agricultural outputs, hence ‘smoothing out’ local variations in harvests; and a 
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largely illiterate and innumerate peasant population. Elvin characterised the confluence of 
these socio-political as well as economic factors as China’s ‘high-level equilibrium trap’, 
which created disincentives to industrialise in Imperial China and reinforced the 
predominantly agricultural nature of the economy and hierarchical structure of society.48 
Indeed, even the economic expansion of late Imperial China suggests a form of high-level 
equilibrium trap, as such activities enabled maintenance of historic family incomes during a 
period of population growth, rather than the accumulation of large financial surpluses from 
agricultural production that are a pre-requisite to industrialisation.49  
 
Institutional enablers of – and constraints to – entrepreneurship between 1949 and 
1978 
The lack of a stable pre-revolutionary tradition of entrepreneurship raises a major question 
regarding the economic development of China after 1949: if pre-revolutionary China did not 
create the conditions and institutions for entrepreneurship, then is it the case that these 
conditions and institutions emerged during Communist rule, before as well as during the post-
1978 reform period? Although there is a widely-shared view that the reform era began in 
December 1978, at the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Chinese Communist Party Congress, some 
reforms can be traced to earlier in that decade and to the first ten years of Communist rule. 
Establishment of a basic healthcare infrastructure in the 1950’s – the ‘barefoot doctors’, 
who received a minimal level of primary healthcare training, designed to treat simple illnesses 
and injuries, and introduce preventive methods – radically reduced infant mortality and 
improved life expectancy in rural areas.50 In addition, primary and secondary education was 
introduced across much of rural China, ensuring basic levels of literacy and numeracy.51 As 
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well as the positive correlation between primary education and reduced infant mortality found 
across all developing economies, these two institutional developments produced a large rural 
workforce that was healthier, more literate, and more numerate. The early to mid-1950s also 
saw restructuring of China’s universities, through merger and the creation of a stronger 
science and technology base. The expansion of education, from basic to advanced, was a 
human capital gain that would be exploited three decades later, particularly through rural 
migration to coastal development zones and major manufacturing centres such as the Pearl 
River delta. By the mid- to late-1950s, as a result, some of the factor conditions for ensuring 
the human capital required for future economic growth during the reform period were 
beginning to emerge. 
However, growth was suppressed from the later 1950s to the early 1970s through 
politicisation of economic activity and a policy of ‘self-reliance’ that saw China turn in on 
itself and caused significant damage to the country’s productive capacity. The Great Leap 
Forward in the second half of the 1950s transformed the centrally planned technocratic 
approach to industrialisation encouraged by Soviet advisers into a ‘backyard’ industrial 
revolution that destroyed agricultural output, created widespread famine and starvation, and 
severely weakened manufacturing.52 The breaking of technical ties with the Soviet Union and, 
after a brief interregnum, the Cultural Revolution, held back China’s economy through most 
of the 1960s. In the last three years of that decade agricultural and overall economic output 
fell considerably. 
By 1970, the excesses of the Cultural Revolution had played out, and a more politically 
sensitive order was established, in which economic development was framed in the rhetoric of 
continued political mobilisation.53 Revolutionary Committees at municipal and district level 
had the power to direct local development based on local conditions and priorities. Previously 
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disgraced cadres were rehabilitated. Communes and brigades were used to better organise 
agricultural production, including recognition of both individual effort and collective output 
measured by ‘work-points’. Productivity and performance increased from 1970 to 1976, with 
agricultural and total economic output almost doubling, after significant falls between 1967 
and 1969.54  
At the local level, there was investment in commune-based enterprises through this period. 
A precursor to the township and village enterprises that drove economic growth in the 1980s 
and 1990s, these ventures were collectively-owned, but in practice were run by individuals 
operating as entrepreneurial managers, overseen by small groups of local government officials 
and affiliates at district and commune level. Many of these enterprises had been established in 
the 1950s or were legacies of pre-revolutionary capitalism in the countryside.55 Typically, the 
national doctrine of ‘self-reliance’ meant that enterprises located in more remote places, such 
as rural Anhui and Sichuan where the agricultural reforms of the early 1980s began, were 
overlooked during periods of turmoil and political mobilisation. 
From 1974 to 1976, with Deng appointed as First Vice Premier, policies were passed to 
stimulate and recognise economic diversification through ‘sideline development’, i.e. the 
encouragement of private and semi-private businesses offering products and services not 
produced by the state-owned or collective sectors, a theme that was dominant in the early 
years of the reform period and shaped state policies towards the informal sector and micro-
enterprises.56  
Economic liberalisation came on the heels of détente and normalisation of relations with the 
US. As a result of agreements signed by both countries in 1971, there was an influx of 
Western technology into China, as firstly industrial, and then power generation machinery, 
was acquired from the US and other countries.57 Even the experimental special economic 
 16 
zones for foreign investors, a banner policy for Deng in the early 1980s, can be traced back to 
tentative steps taken by the administration of Hua Guofeng in the mid-1970s.58 There was, in 
other words, a shift towards opening up and experimental reform during the 1970s that 
preceded the post-1978 reform period. 
 
Institutional adaptation and transformation since 1978 
Unlike the transition economies of the Former Soviet Union, there has been no fundamental 
change in the economic and political structures of reform-era China. This has created an 
environment in which institutions established during the period of Maoist central planning 
have evolved and adapted within an environment of increasing market liberalisation. In this 
section of the paper, we explore four dimensions of this evolution. First, we consider how the 
structures of centralised economic control by the Chinese state have adapted and evolved as 
the priorities of economic reform have developed. Second, we consider the development of 
quasi-formal contractual arrangements in the absence of private property rights, and how this 
enabled entrepreneurship in an institutional environment that is not conducive to private 
sector development. Third, we examine the emergence of local partnerships between 
government and enterprises to enable economic growth. Finally, we examine the changing 
nature of guanxi, an institution that enables bilateral exchange through favour trading, and its 
lessening importance to entrepreneurial success.  
 
Evolution of State Bodies from the Planned to Market Economy 
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During the current reform period, the Communist Party has created an institutional context 
within which markets have been liberalised and private sector competition encouraged, even 
though many of the entities and institutions involved in, and enabling these changes, were 
designed to control a planned economy within a Communist political system. These include 
the five-year planning cycle that continues to direct state expenditure and policy, as well as 
state organs developed for a centrally controlled state economy. As a result, the Chinese state 
has maintained the ‘enforcement mechanisms’ that are a key component of the regulative 
institutions that are needed to govern economic development.59 This has enabled the state to 
develop a programme of legislation to recognise and support the private sector within an 
evolving formal institutional framework that has modified itself over time.60 Continuity in the 
formal regulative institutions that have shaped China during its reform period has prevented 
the ‘messiness and chaos of…economic transition’ evident in transition economies that have 
sought to create new market institutions to replace existing institutions developed for a 
planned economy.61  
A dynamic of institutional adaptation rather than replacement can be seen in the evolution 
of key state agencies and the functional roles they have played in economic reform and 
development. Over the reform period, key agencies established in the pre-reform period have 
adapted to the new economic landscape of increased market liberalisation, and in doing so 
have changed themselves as the wider institutions of economic reform have evolved. During 
the early years of reform, the State Planning Commission (SPC), which was established in the 
early 1950s to coordinate economic planning, including setting production quotas, oversaw 
industrial development across national government during the 1980s. As the economy has 
changed, shifting emphasis from supporting state-owned to collective and then private 
enterprises, state commissions transformed, adapting their strategic roles to the specific 
development needs of the period. The SPC and the State Planning Development Commission 
 18 
were combined in the early 1990s to establish, initially, the State Economic Commission 
(SEC), which focused on restructuring of the state-owned sector as the primary emphasis of 
economic planning during the second half of this decade. The SEC was then transformed into 
the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), reflecting a growing emphasis on 
economic harmonisation and trade liberalisation as a result of entry into the World Trade 
Organisation. The SETC has since become the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC), which increasingly emphasises macro-economic management, 
reflecting more recent state concerns with economic stability. Over the reform period, each 
commission absorbed personnel as well as responsibilities from its predecessor(s), re-aligned 
to the specific development priorities and challenges of particular stages of China’s reform 
period. In this way, key organs of the state adapted to reflect the broader structural changes to 
the institutional framework that were being pursued at particular stages of reform.  
Through ownership transfer to the private sector, the Chinese state has changed its 
relationship with enterprises, from direct control within a planned production framework to 
developing an institutional framework and economic conditions that enable and stimulate 
private sector development.62 The continued existence, and incremental evolution, of major 
policy bodies and the continuation of key policy-making institutions, such as five-year plans 
and the associated central planning apparatus, provided a sense of continuity and gradual 
adaption rather than sudden change. From this perspective, China has not experienced the 
‘voids’ that emerged in states undergoing rapid and substantive change to its economic and 
political institutions, as was the case in the former Soviet Bloc.63 Instead, Chinese policy 
makers have faced a different type of challenge: how to transform institutions designed for a 
centrally planned economy into ones that enable markets to work efficiently.  
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As well as playing a key role in recognising private entrepreneurs as key drivers of 
economic growth,64 the Communist Party created constraints to entrepreneurship during the 
post-1978 period of reform. The experience of banking institutions through the reform period 
exemplifies the non-market expectations and requirements placed on key economic 
institutions. In the early years, standard practices such as effective and objective risk 
management and credit control were not practised in state-controlled banks, which served as a 
mechanism for distributing resources to often inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
rather than as an open credit facility. The institutional dysfunctionalities that this created 
generated huge debt exposures, and effectively ‘red-lined’ the private sector, which found it 
difficult to raise capital from state banks.65 The rationale for this was both political and social, 
as the state sought to prop up SOEs that employed a significant proportion of the working 
urban population.  
An institutional preference for state-owned or controlled enterprises is evident for much of 
the reform period, even after national recognition of entrepreneurs in the early 2000s. In 
China today private enterprises continue to be discriminated against by the formal financial 
system.66 For example, even though they account for the majority of domestic output, they 
receive less than 20% of bank financing.67 In addition, equity markets are still immature and 
have not been effective in allocating resources in the Chinese economy.68 In the last decade 
state-owned enterprises captured around 57% of the equity from capital markets, leaving a 
limited proportion to the private sector, especially small and medium-sized enterprises.69 
A further constraint has arisen because formal regulations are not always upheld 
consistently, and state sanctions are often applied variably. In many instances, inconsistencies 
in upholding formal institutions reflect wider political considerations, and decisions: for 
example, where this relates to political factions and the fortunes of groups or individuals 
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within the party.70 They also reflect a well-rehearsed tendency for local government to co-opt 
and adapt national legislation and policy to fit local needs and priorities.71  
 
Entrepreneurship without private property rights, but with contracts 
It is a standard tenet of development that private property rights are a necessary 
condition for sustaining economic growth, since they allow entrepreneurs to retain the 
surpluses generated from their entrepreneurial activities.72 Where property rights do not 
exist or are ambiguous, the private sector will be constrained, and the capacity for 
entrepreneurs to generate wealth that in turn stimulates economic growth will be 
limited. Indeed, the current orthodoxy in international development is that the transfer 
of private property rights is a pre-condition of income growth through private sector 
development and without this poverty reduction cannot occur.73 In China, however, this 
proposition has not applied, as entrepreneurship has grown drastically without clear and 
enforceable formal private property rights.74 Through most of the reform period in 
China there has been no formal legal protection of private ownership rights.75 Instead, 
there were multiple and ambiguous forms of ownership and no clear framework for the 
governance of private enterprises. A National Property Law that legislated for private 
ownership was only passed in 2007, and it has since been implemented inconsistently, 
as can be seen by the continued trend for some officials to expropriate resources and 
take over control of private enterprises on a periodic and ad hoc basis.76  
How, then, and why did China’s private and non-state sector grow so rapidly during the 
reform period, given the lack of an enabling institutional framework of formal property 
rights? One of the major institutional innovations of reform-era China has been the 
contracting out of state property, creating hybrid forms of enterprise that are publicly owned 
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but privately managed. Contracting has been a standard form of managed transition from a 
planned to a private economy through much of the reform era in China. Under contract-based 
relationships, the state retains ownership of the asset, whether land or an enterprise, and enters 
into an agreement to make that asset available to private individuals or entities who take 
responsibility for output and production. Contracts are drawn up that specify the nature of the 
charge to be paid to the state for the rights to use the asset productively, as well as its duration 
and any limits or constraints on its use. The emergence of contracts as a way of preserving 
state ownership of assets while allowing private exploitation of them enabled expansion of 
entrepreneurial activity within a state-controlled economy. 
Contracting out agricultural production to households (bao chan dao hu) began 
spontaneously in rural Anhui province, as a means of breaking out of the productive 
inefficiencies of collective farming that became the organising logic of agriculture in China 
between 1952-53 and the early 1980s.77 Contracting out agricultural land was formally 
extended to other provinces after extensive investigation by the central government, and 
arrangements were extended to include contracting out the plot of land itself, with households 
signing long-term leases (bao gan dao hu). By 1983, 94% of rural farming households across 
China were involving in a form of contracting, having signed annual agreements with their 
collective or local government that stipulated output targets, inputs and payments to be 
made.78 Households retained resources above and beyond the targets set in these agreements. 
The result was significant increases in agricultural production through the 1980s.79  
Contracting also underpinned the emergence of township and village enterprises (TVEs) in 
rural areas through the 1980s. TVEs took multiple forms, ranging from private enterprises 
that operated under the ‘red hat’ of collective ownership but in practice were private 
businesses through to enterprises owned by a local township or village government but 
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managed by a third party.80 Similar contracting arrangements to those in agriculture were 
established, with ‘production’ being contracted out on the basis of several arrangements, 
including a management fee, retention of surpluses above agreed targets by the manager(s), or 
profit-sharing arrangements.81 The result of this loosening of public control over enterprise 
management was rapid growth of the TVE sector through the 1980s and into the 1990s. Over 
this period, contracting strategies were also adopted to transfer the management of loss-
making SOEs into private hands, often as a precursor to sale of the enterprise to the individual 
or entity holding the contract arrangement for that enterprise. 
As state ownership receded, firstly through the transfer of loss-making TVEs into private 
hands,82 and then through the ‘release’ of smaller, typically loss-making SOEs into private 
control, contracting arrangements became increasingly redundant. National statistics indicate 
a significant rise in the private enterprise population in the early 2000s following on from 
privatisation of both SOEs and TVEs during the 1990s.83 As a result, the relationship between 
the state and enterprises has changed, from contracting arrangements to transfers of assets to 
private entrepreneurs.84 Contracting, in other words, became an increasingly anachronistic 
institutional innovation once the state had relinquished many of the assets it would have 
leased out during the earlier years of reform. 
Through contracting, the state created a quasi-formal framework that allowed for some 
recognition of private management of enterprises. This framework was executed through 
specific contracts, with no formal legal history of precedents or enforced universal legislation 
(institutions of central importance to effective legal compliance and hence reduced transaction 
costs). The possibility of legal redress, should contracts be contravened, provided a limited 
degree of protection. More importantly, contracts had a symbolic and public significance, 
signalling an explicit and mutual agreement to let public assets be managed by private hands. 
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Protests around expropriation can be seen as reaction to local government breaking an explicit 
contract, and hence a symbolic commitment to complying with the contract. The notion of 
contracts, with weaker formal dimensions but stronger symbolic power, provides a more 
compelling basis for understanding how property rights were negotiated and allocated in 
China than reference to an ‘established folk concept of property rights’,85 not least because of 
the weakness of such a folk concept in pre-communist China, as we outlined earlier in this 
paper. 
 
State pragmatism – government adaptation to enable enterprise development. 
Engagement in contracting highlights one way in which local government has played a 
central role in economic development through much of the reform period, and in 
particular until the end of the 1990s, when a ‘soft centralisation’ was imposed that 
reduced levels of local autonomy in economic development decision making.86 Local 
governments also adopted pro-development and pro-growth roles across much of China, 
as ‘public entrepreneurs’ and in partnership with private enterprises. Local economic 
development partnerships between the state and private sector emerged as a distinctive 
institutional feature of many of the areas where growth was greatest in China, especially 
during the 1980s and 1990s. Examples that have been highlighted have tended to be in 
areas of economic liberalisation and growth, in particular Guangdong province and 
many of the Eastern coastal provinces.87 However, pro-development local governments 
can be found in parts of China where foreign investment was minimal.88  
Local governments encouraged economic growth by supporting and providing investment 
for private as well as collective and state enterprises. Even where local government focused 
on friends and family, creating new economic and social hierarchies, investments and 
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sponsorship extended beyond the ‘feudal relationships’ of patronage and nepotism to include 
strategic investments in growing enterprises regardless of ownership.89 These ways of 
working transcended cronyism, i.e., preferential treatment of family and friends, enabling a 
wider group of enterprises to grow and contribute to increases in local prosperity. However, 
state activism has not always been benevolent. Local government intervention in enterprise 
management has also led to instances of non-productive expropriation of assets and profits, by 
officials wanting to extract the increased returns generated by these new forms of economic 
activity.90 
Over the last 15 years there has been a shift from local pro-growth models of government to 
national endorsement of the private sector, reflecting rising centralisation of state control.91 
This has benefitted individual entrepreneurs, who increasingly are endorsed by the 
Communist Party and state. Publicity campaigns as well as legislation have publicly 
articulated strong support for the private sector as an important driver of economic growth. 
Membership of the Communist Party, and its affiliated entities, can be considered a 
particularly powerful normative institution that provides access to privileges, opportunities 
and networks that produce positive social and political as well as economic gains.92 In a 
country where there is a strong tradition of top-down messages and campaigns to shape 
shared values and perceptions, Party sponsorship of private enterprise is likely to be a 
significant influence on informal cultural-cognitive institutions.93  
Reassessing network-based trust and guanxi in post-1949 China 
The political and social turbulence of Maoist China undermined many established institutions, 
as ‘feudal’ values were attacked and traditional networks of trust-based relationships 
dismantled from the outset of Communist Party rule and over much of the three decades after 
1949.94 Successive political campaigns and mass mobilisation programmes emphasised the 
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importance of commitment and loyalty to the Party, which transcended, and displaced, ties 
with family and kinship groups. Confucian values of hierarchical subordination were directly 
attacked: for example, through campaigns to create greater equality between men and women, 
as well as by repeated encouragement of young people to denounce their reactionary elders (a 
prevalent feature of the Cultural Revolution). Maoist political rhetoric explicitly encouraged 
the youth to reject their own families and embrace the comradeship of the Chinese 
Communist Party.95  
During 1950 and 1951, politicisation of village life, and in particular attacks on ‘landlord’ 
peasant families, created social dislocation and strife in the countryside, destroying economic 
wealth and family enterprises.96 Collectivisation in 1952 and 1953 eroded the family unit and 
local communities, because communes reorganised community life around mass work and 
living, rather than private kinship units and networks. Collectives remained the basis for 
agricultural production, and life, through the pre-reform period. Attacks on, and collapses of, 
family structures were major features of the Great Leap Forward. Erosion of the family unit 
was compounded when Red Guards first left their homes in the late 1960s and then were ‘sent 
down’ to the countryside in the 1970s, many not returning to their urban homes until late in 
that decade or early in the 1980s. Widespread mobilisation of rural peasants on major 
infrastructure projects split families and displaced people from their traditional homes. 
Conditions such as these were unpropitious for sustaining local networks. In a highly 
politicised environment, where loyalty to Mao and the Party was prized above personal 
relations, trust often broke down as members of the same family, kinship group or local 
community competed to demonstrate political loyalty. The post-Mao literature on the Cultural 
Revolution provides accounts of children denouncing their parents to preserve their record of 
political commitment.97 Under these circumstances, network-based trust was traded for wider 
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socio-political recognition, often acquired through public rejection of emotional, kinship and 
community loyalties. 
Politicisation of society, and public attacks on hereditary ties, created the conditions for 
traditional loyalties and associations to be eroded and replaced with the new ‘family’ of party 
comradeship.98 The scale of this mobilisation, and the massive changes these dynamics 
created, should not be underestimated. Standard institutional theories propose that informal 
institutions such as customs, traditions, norms and beliefs change over centuries, based on the 
assumption that ‘informal institutions have mainly spontaneous origins – which is to say that 
deliberative choice of a calculative kind is minimally implicated’.99 In post-1949 China, 
however, successive calculated changes to institutions were initiated by the Party, starting in 
the early 1950s with the appropriation of farmland from landowners, and followed rapidly by 
collectivisation of agricultural production. Major institutional changes resulted in social and 
economic turbulence, and, in the case of the Great Leap Forward, breakdown. Dikotter 
describes in great detail the mass starvation, and resultant collapse of social structures and 
societal norms and values that occurred as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward to 
generate sustainable and productive industrial growth.100 In particular, the notion of the 
family and community was eradicated in many areas, when children were first taken away 
from their mothers, who were then ‘liberated’ to work, and then made to work themselves, 
often in dangerous conditions,101 the elderly were abandoned, left to starve by their families 
and communities,102 and individuals resisted the collective through shirking,103 theft and 
fraud.104 
The scale, pace and turbulence of political mobilisation to attack and remove traditional 
informal institutions through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, combined with the institutional flux 
and political uncertainty that characterised China before the Communists came to power in 
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1949, suggest that networks of trust and traditional Confucian values of kinship and 
community affiliation would have been eroded by the advent of economic reform in the late 
1970s. As a result, a case can be made that network-based trust has been severely undermined 
in Communist China, and that local and particularistic loyalties that arose from substantive 
rather than formal rationalities were attacked during the Maoist period. As Vogel noted, 
dedication to Maoism as a value system, and to Mao as a figurehead, replaced personal 
relationships. This resulted in individuals committing to the Western universalism of the 
communist state, in which many Chinese citizens placed great trust (both genuinely and as an 
expedient means of survival and personal advancement).105 
Trust based on traditional kinship and community networks is evident in contemporary 
China in the exception rather than the norm, supporting the notion that broader societal trust 
eroded after 1949. Wenzhou, for example, which has been recognised as one of the 
entrepreneurial ‘success stories’ of China, is distinctive not only because of its economic 
dynamism but also because it has a strong local culture of entrepreneurship underpinned by a 
sense of local community informed by mistrust of the state and ‘outsiders’.106 Such 
‘traditional’ values are also evident in minority ethnicities, which have been largely 
marginalised in contemporary China. In cases such as these, trust-based networks are 
defensive, rather than enabling, in that they offer a means of mobilising scarce resources and 
defending the group against the interests and incursions of others. 
The erosion of network-based trust in Communist China helps in part to explain why 
symbolic demonstrations and rituals of reciprocal gift and favour exchange have been 
important during the period of reform, especially during its early years. In a culture where 
traditional kinship and community foundations for group trust have been systematically 
eroded by a politicised state, gift exchange and the trading of like-for-like favours offers an 
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explicit and hence more enforceable semi-formal ‘currency’ for governing exchange. The 
benefits of favour exchange to regulate trading and commerce were higher at the outset of the 
reform period, when the institutional mechanisms for governing market exchange were 
emerging rapidly, and so were unclear and subject to change. 
The institutional ‘rules of the game’ for increasingly liberalised market exchange were 
underdeveloped in the early reform period, with prices continuing to be distorted as a result of 
the parallel system of dual pricing (both state-controlled and market-determined), thus 
creating ambiguity around trading mechanisms and protocols. This placed increased emphasis 
on building new forms of trust relationships and governance mechanisms in an institutional 
context where markets were partially formed and enforcement mechanisms unclear. 
Reciprocal exchange routines, such as gift giving and the exchange of favours through guanxi 
arrangements, helped develop personalised forms of negotiated and bartered trust, and hence 
bilateral governance frameworks for exchange.107 In a context where market trading was new 
and unfamiliar to many, reciprocity signalled commitment to the exchange, thereby offering a 
loose governance framework, albeit one that could be difficult to enforce should one party 
renege on the agreement. 
The nature of guanxi, and its role in market transactions, has since changed considerably. 
Reconsiderations of guanxi emphasise its inherently adaptive and malleable nature, and in 
doing so challenge notions of it as a ‘fixed’ or ‘essential’ dynamic, and hence a traditional 
institution within Chinese society.108 Whereas some reconsiderations of guanxi argued for its 
persistence as an evolving institution, there is debate as to its continuing importance in 
enabling market exchange. Guthrie noted the declining importance of personalised guanxi 
during this period.109 More recent empirical analysis supports this view of the declining 
significance of guanxi for the economic growth of private enterprises, with studies providing 
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evidence that guanxi, while still important, is not as significant as management and 
organisational competence to entrepreneurial success in China.110  
 
Conclusion: Rule ambiguities for entrepreneurs in reform-era China 
This paper has explored the emergence of a dynamic private sector in China during a period 
when many of the formal institutions that enable entrepreneurship were lacking. The evidence 
does not support a pre-Communist entrepreneurial tradition that has been re-discovered 
during the current reform period. Moreover, the conditions for economic growth can be traced 
in part to institutional developments and reforms in the 1950s and early to mid-1970s, as well 
as to reforms introduced since 1978. 
Institutional innovations specific to China, in particular, adaptation of existing institutions 
designed for a planned economy, alongside widespread use of contracting to deal with 
ownership issues, and pervasive local experimentation and adaptation, created ‘bottom-up’, 
emergent and hence quasi-formal institutional frameworks that enabled localised 
entrepreneurial emergence, despite a national framework that privileged state-owned over 
private enterprises. More recent institutional developments have increasingly emphasised 
convergence with the developed OECD nations, thereby further modifying earlier institutional 
arrangements. 
China’s economic growth during the post-1978 reform period, in other words, has been 
based on adaptation rather than creation of institutions to enable governance of market 
exchange. The often improvised and reactive nature of institutional adaptation has prevented a 
single coherent pattern of economic reform, and has generated a wider economic context of 
evolution rather than displacement of institutions. As a result, the ‘voids’ evident in the 
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transition economies of the Former Soviet Union, which arose as the institutions of economic 
planning were removed and market institutions created, are neither readily apparent nor 
pervasive during China’s recent period of economic reform. Instead, institutions have evolved 
and agencies and policies modified to ensure institutional arrangements align with emerging 
forms of economic activity and organisation.111  
Adaptation of institutions and their related agencies and mechanisms to evolving economic 
structures has created what may be termed ‘rule ambiguity’ in market exchange and 
governance. Rule ambiguities arise when changing institutional arrangements alter the ‘rules 
of the game’, which as a result are in flux and not stable. Changes in the institutional rules of 
the game create ambiguity, because they create conditions where the nature and quality of 
information is uncertain and so entrepreneurs cannot use this information to make effective 
decisions.112 Ambiguity is defined as ‘uncertainty about [the] probability’ that the information 
will produce expected results and outcomes.113 Uncertainty about the changing nature of these 
rules creates institutional ambiguities, in the sense that while they are occurring, these 
changes make market transactions less predictable. In other words, rule ambiguities arise 
when there is uncertainty about the quality of information relating to a transaction. 
In these circumstances, which have been typical of China during the reform period, the 
institutional rules that govern exchange – both formal and informal – are not fixed and the 
norms for market activity as a result are not agreed or codified. Such an environment 
generates opportunities that entrepreneurs exploit, in that rule ambiguities create mismatches 
between demand and supply as well as information asymmetries, which in turn become rents 
that an entrepreneur can exploit as long as these ambiguities persist.114 The persistence of rule 
ambiguities provides an explanation as to why the private sector has expanded while the 
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institutions of a market economy were not developed and the institutions of a transition 
economy were mutating and evolving. 
Opportunity-creating rule ambiguities also create challenges for entrepreneurs, who cannot 
be confident of the transaction costs of market exchange or the extent to which such 
exchanges are enforced. Under conditions of rule ambiguity, there may not be an agreed and 
consistent basis on which private enterprises can continue to exploit opportunities. Unclear 
and changing relationships between business and government can lead to dysfunctional 
behaviours by the state, ranging from lack of support for the private sector through to 
expropriation of assets and resources.115 As a result, entrepreneurs take on the risk that rule 
ambiguities could lead to expropriation of surpluses or summary termination of an exploited 
market opportunity by the state. In a context of on-going rule ambiguity, the deployment of 
personal relationships and reciprocal favour exchange, mediated through guanxi 
arrangements, provide personalised measures for managing risk and uncertainty in economic 
exchange. However, they do not constitute a clear and enforceable legal framework or a 
public regime of formal and informal sanctions that punish avoidance, cheating or dishonesty. 
Instead, they create a transaction-specific arrangement reached by mutual negotiation, rather 
than through a normalised governance framework, and so are vulnerable to abuse or 
termination. The nature of these guanxi arrangements therefore can generate the adverse 
effects from rule ambiguities that these arrangements were seeking to mitigate. 
The notion of rule ambiguities highlights a central paradox of the reform era in China. Rule 
ambiguities create mismatches between demand and supply, often as a result of information 
asymmetries between consumer and seller. These mismatches create market opportunities for 
entrepreneurs who are able to exploit these market imperfections. In a transition economy 
where rule ambiguities persist over time, as institutions evolve, profits from market 
 32 
imperfections are likely to hold for longer than in economies where market institutions enable 
efficient transmission and sharing of information. Rule ambiguities, in other words, generate 
entrepreneurial rents than can be durable over considerable periods in countries such as 
China, whereas in more mature market economies these rents would quickly disappear 
through efficient information flows. 
However, rule ambiguities make the transactional environment of the entrepreneur 
challenging, and increase the vulnerability of private enterprises not protected by the public 
patronage enjoyed by state- and collectively-owned enterprises. For private enterprises 
without such patronage, there is no assurance of recourse to arbitrating institutions, such as a 
commercial law system that is complied with, and there is reduced scope to secure 
intervention by the state in their favour. Rule ambiguities therefore create entrepreneurial 
opportunity, but they also undermine safe, secure and predictable economic transactions, 
hence making opportunity exploitation risky and vulnerable. This paradox can be seen 
anecdotally in China, where many individuals set up businesses after having identified 
opportunities, but are then unable to sustain them because of institutional ambiguities that fail 
to effectively govern these opportunities. 
Although rule ambiguities are evident, there are cases where institutional clarifications are 
slowly addressing these transactional frailties in market exchange. The 2007 National 
Property Law is a case in point. Whereas such legislation was not acceptable to the 
Communist Party and state in the 1990s, its endorsement in the 2000s created a clearer 
institutional foundation for protecting the surpluses generated by private entrepreneurs. 
However, wide-scale non-compliance and a fragile legal system make redress under this 
legislation challenging and generally difficult to secure.116 Rule ambiguities persist, in other 
 33 
words, and are being addressed as the legal system is being strengthened as a means of 
seeking formal redress for violations of law.117  
As has been noted earlier in this paper, the dynamics of institutional change and evolution, 
and the rule ambiguities this generates, have occurred within a broader context of macro-
economic growth through market liberalisation and enhancement of factor inputs, in particular 
technology and human capital, as well as investment and intervention by the state. These 
wider growth effects have stimulated rising demand from consumers and businesses as well 
as driving improved performance of firms and improved efficiencies in their management. 
Within this context, dynamics of institutional change have had an important effect on private 
sector emergence and development. However, broader dynamics of economic growth have 
also had a fundamentally positive impact on entrepreneurial activity. Combined with the 
institutions that emerged in reform era China, which are particular to that context, wider 
growth effects also helped entrepreneurship to emerge when many market institutions were 
under-developed. Our analysis indicates that without institutional developments that sought to 
respond to the specific growth challenges at different points in the reform period – such as the 
emergence of hybrid entrepreneurship and the widespread use of contracts in place of private 
ownership – the conditions for entrepreneurial emergence would not have been as conducive, 
even within this broader context of rapid economic growth.
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